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STUDENT MATERIAL
Student Notes
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AND ABORTION: A
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION TO WEST
VIRGINIA'S LEGISLATURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun' seemed to be thinking aloud during oral arguments late
last year (1982) when the Court entertained "the most comprehensive review
of national abortion policy"2 since Roe v. Wade.3 In one of the five cases ar-
gued before the Court on November 30th,4 the defendant, Dr. Simopoulos, op-
erated an abortion clinic in Falls Church, Virginia. His patient was a minor, six
months pregnant, who was anxious to conceal her condition from her parents.5
An abortion was induced by saline amniocentesis. This method, commonly
used during the mid-trimester period of pregnancy, accomplishes the abortion
by inserting a hollow needle through the woman's abdomen into the amniotic
sac, withdrawing some of the amniotic fluid and injecting a hypertonic solu-
tion. Within several hours, the fetus dies of acute salt poisoning. About
twenty-four hours later, labor begins, and the dead fetus is ultimately deliv-
ered.0 The defendant's youthful patient was injected and left the clinic without
supervision (her parents were not made aware of the operation). She subse-
quently checked into a motel, where, two days later, the fetus was expelled and
left in a trash can.
7
Justice Blackmun interjected, "[i]t's distressing that she went to a motel
and not a hospital."8 Similar distress has been expressed by many who oppose
abortions generally, but are more particularly concerned with the results of
allowing an adolescent to have such a traumatic experience without the advice
or support of her parents. So far, at least fifteen states have responded to this
concern with legislation requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion
I Justice Harry Blackmun, who represented the world famous Mayo Clinic when he was a
practicing lawyer, authored the opinion of the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and has been in the forefront of the Court's efforts to secure
women's rights to choose to terminate pregnancies-consistently expressing opinions which favor
liberal access to abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
2 51 U.S.L.W. 3433 (Dec. 7, 1982).
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S.E.2d 194 (1981).
5 221 Va. at 1063-64, 277 S.E.2d at 196.
6 J. WILKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 30 (1975).
7 Simopoulos, 221 Va. at 1063-64, 277 S.E.2d at 196.
8 51 U.S.L.W. 3434. The editors of the United States Law Week provide summaries of oral
arguments before the Court, occasionally quoting the participants.
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decision.'
West Virginia is not among the states which have enacted such legislation,
although a parental notification bill was introduced and given considerable at-
tention in the last two legislative sessions.10 If the proposed law had been
passed, it would have required a treating physician to notify the parents of a
minor who intends to have an abortion." Of course, it is not as simple as that.
The bill included, among other provisions, an exception for minors who are
deemed to be mature enough to make the decision independently and an ex-
ception for minors who demonstrate that parental notification would not be in
their best interests. The law would have also imposed criminal penalties on
physicians who failed to comply with the notification requirements.
Despite the failure of the parental notification bill in the last two sessions
of the legislature, its proponents intend to introduce it again, if possible.
Therefore, the main objective of this Note is to determine the constitutional
status of the proposed law. If the constitutionality of the bill is settled at the
outset, the legislature will be left with the duty of determining whether the
interests fostered by this law reflect the values of West Virginians.
Section II of this Note discusses some general and historical background
on the abortion issue. Section III examines the constitutional parameters of
parental involvement as established by a series of United States Supreme
Court cases decided since Roe v. Wade.'2 Section IV examines the constitution-
ality of West Virginia's proposed parental notification law. Section V discusses
parental involvement from a "policy" perspective. Section VI suggests a model
parental notification statute for consideration by the legislature.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Abortion In The United States
Twenty-five years ago abortion was prohibited in all fifty states, except
when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.13 In contrast, over
ten million abortions have been legally performed in this country in less than
9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a)(West 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-23.3 (1982); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299.35.5 (West Supp.
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1597 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12 S (West
Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. § 144,343 (1983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
347 (1982 Cum. Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03 (Supp. 1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206
(1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-304 (1978).
10 Senate Bill No. 243 was introduced January 25, 1982, by Senator Huffman and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary; Senate Bill No. 188 was introduced January 21, 1983, by Senators
Ash and Huffman, and also referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
" See infra notes 89 and 95.
'2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13 L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 3 (1982). "[Roe] invalidated every
abortion statute then in effect in the United States, and, in practical effect, legalized abortion on
demand in this country." Moore, Moral Sentiment in Opinions in Abortion, 15 SANTA CLARA L,
REV. 591, 633 (1975); See also Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, Foreward: Toward A Model
of Roles in the Due Process of Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973).
[Vol. 85
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ten years since Roe v. Wade. 4 Current statistics indicate that approximately
thirty percent of all pregnancies are terminated by abortion, 5 and in some
areas (e.g., Washington, D.C. and New York City) there are more abortions
than live births." Abortion is the most common operation in the United
States.'" Yet it is a medical procedure that remains shrouded in controversy.
Serious attempts to pass a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution" and
widespread involvement in local and national pro-life organizations' 9 indicate
that there is still substantial opposition to legalized abortion.
Abortions performed on minors have become a singularly emotional issue
in the national controversy. The ratio of abortions to pregnancies is substan-
tially higher among teenagers than any other age group. Fifty-eight percent of
all pregnancies of girls under age fifteen are aborted. Girls aged fifteen through
nineteen terminate forty-three percent of their pregnancies by abortion.2 0
Nearly one-third of all abortions performed in the United States are on
teenagers.
21
B. Abortion in West Virginia
The abortion issue is no less volatile in the State of West Virginia and has
been the subject of litigation and, more recently, legislation. In West Virginia,
the statute prohibiting abortion 22 has never been repealed. However, it was
ruled unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v.
Charleston Area Medical Center,2 3 pursuant to the clear mandate of the
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade24 and Doe v. Bolton.25 The chal-
lenge arose in West Virginia when a pregnant woman sought injunctive relief
14 L. WARDLE & M. WoOD, supra note 13.
5 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1979 ANNUAL SUMMARY, 103 (1980).
16 Id.
" C. RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS ON ABORTION 1 (1979).
18 In 1981 alone, 12 different pro-life amendments were proposed. For example, the Garn-
Oberstar Amendment provides:
SECTION 1. With respect to the right to life, the word "person" as used in this article
and in the fifth and fourteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States applies to all human beings irrespective of age, health, function, or condition of
dependency, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their biological
development.
SECTION 2. No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person: Provided how-
ever, That nothing in this article shall prohibit a law permitting only those medical pro-
cedures required to prevent the death of the mother.
SECTION 3. The Congress and the several states shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
See also L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, A LAwYER LOOKS AT ABORTION, Appendix A (1982).
1 TIME, April 6, 1981 at 21.
20 Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion in the United States, 1978, 13 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 1, 17, 18, Tables 10 and 11 (1981).
21 Tietze, Teenage Pregnancies: Looking Ahead to 1984, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 205 (1978).
22 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-8 (1977).
:3 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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against the Charleston Area Medical Center (C.A.M.C.). C.A.M.C. had refused
to perform the abortion she desired, based on the unrepealed prohibition in
the West Virginia Code. The judge of the federal district court refused to grant
the injunction and dismissed the complaint because, in his opinion, "Doe" had
failed to show irreparable harm. The rationale for Judge Knapp's futile rebel-
lion is characterized in his query: "Who can say that irreparable injury will
result from the inability to terminate a pregnancy which has the potential to
give life and love beyond measure?""6 The dutiful circuit court was not long
detained by this argument, responding: "The court's statement is surely an
accurate reflection of human experience where the birth of a child is desired. It
is not an accurate statement of the law where a woman wishes to terminate her
pregnancy.' '2 7 With the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Doe v. Charleston Area Med-
ical Center, West Virginia is left with no operative law on abortion.28
In West Virginia, no government agency has been designated to accumu-
late information regarding abortions; so it is difficult to estimate the number of
abortions being performed. The Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) in
Atlanta, Georgia, attempts to obtain this information from individual suppliers
of abortion services, but admits that such information is inaccurate and incom-
plete.29 The most recent year for which CDC has information on West Virginia
is 1978, and its sources indicate that 2,758 abortions were performed in West
Virginia that year, with 425 involving nonresidents. Information from other
states indicates that another 1,990 West Virginians had abortions outside the
state during 1978.0
Historically, many West Virginians went out of state to preserve anonym-
ity.31 Several neighboring states have private clinics close to West Virginia.
Such private clinics typically offer quick service with maximum confidentiality.
Two private clinics have opened more recently in West Virginia: Women's
Health Center, in Charleston, and Wheeling Medical Services, in Wheeling. In-
formation provided by the Charleston clinic indicated that approximately
fifteen abortions are performed per day on three days of the week. 2 This
amounts to 2,340 abortions per year at that facility, if its estimate is accurate.
Abortions are also performed by private physicians in hospitals to some extent
in West Virginia. Since there is no legislative guidance or administrative regu-
lation, West Virginia hospitals and private physicians adopt their own guide-
lines within the constitutional parameters of Roe v. Wade and its progeny. For
example, West Virginia University Medical Center performs nontherapeutic
28 Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d at 644.
27 Id.
28 At least one circuit court in West Virginia has ruled that section 61-2-8 is defunct. See Roe
v. Winter, No. 13,228 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Kanawha County 1975). This decision was apparently not
reviewed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
1' Telephone interview with CDC representative, Atlanta, Georgia (Feb. 22, 1983).
30 Id.
3' Telephone interview with Bob Russell, Assistant Project Director, State-wide Family Plan-
ning, Charleston, W. Va. (Feb. 22, 1983).
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abortions up to the twentieth week of pregnancy.33
The statistical information supplied by CDC does not reflect the age of
those having abortions, but one of the private clinics, mentioned above, reports
that approximately 18 percent of the abortions performed there were on girls
under eighteen.3 4 Neither of the private clinics requires parental notification or
consent. The West Virginia University Medical Center does require consent
from the parents of unemancipated minors.
35
C. Legislation and Litigation
Abortion generally and abortions for minors particularly are issues of sub-
stantial interest and widespread disagreement. There is enough support for
limiting access to abortions to keep all state legislatures busy considering regu-
latory laws. There is also enough opposition to such regulation to keep the
courts busy reviewing the laws. The parental involvement legislation has fol-
lowed this pattern. So far every statute involving parental notification has
come under searching judicial scrutiny.
3 6
Some respected legal scholars have suggested that the inevitable cycle of
legislation and litigation which occurs over virtually every attempt to regulate
abortion services is reminiscent of the Lochner era of "substantive due pro-
cess. ' '37 The United States Solicitor General recommended that the Court
should relinquish its role as a superlegislature or legislative overseer by volun-
tarily abstaining in abortion cases.38 However, the Court has not shown any
inclination to retreat from its activist role in shaping abortion policy. The next
section will discuss the policy which has been formulated by the Court, partic-
ularly as it relates to the parental notification issue.
3 Telephone interview with Dr. Reamy at West Virginia University Medical Center in Mor-
gantown (Jan. 13, 1983).
34 WHEELING MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., CLINIC UPDATE-JANUARY 1982 TO DECEMBER 1982 (a
statistical report in the author's possession).
"5 Interview, supra note 32.
6 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 2266 (1982); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2267 (1982); Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d
1375 (7th Cir. 1978); Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 552 F. Supp.
791 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, No. 1P 82-1766-C (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 1982);
Hodgson v. Minn., No. 3-81 CIV. 538 (D. Minn. March 23, 1982); Women's Medical Center of
Providence Inc. v. Roberts, 530 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I. 1982); Orr v. Knowles, No. CV-81-0-301 (D.
Neb. May 30, 1981); Planned Parenthood of Memphis v. Alexander, No. 78-2310 (W.D. Tenn.
March 23, 1981); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, Civ. No. 79-1628 (D. Me.
Sept. 17, 1979); Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
37 A. VAN ALsTYNE, SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381-83 (2d ed. 1979).
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A majority of the states regarded abortion to be a criminal act prior to
1973. Then, with a single, Bunyan-like, stroke, Roe v. Wade39 cleared the legal
landscape of laws prohibiting abortion. But, despite the broad implications of
the Roe decision, the factual setting only raised a limited number of related
issues. The Court specifically reserved the issue of parental involvement for
later consideration.
40
Since Roe v. Wade, the Court has reviewed the parental involvement issue
in three cases. From this trilogy emerges a fairly clear, model of a parental
notification law which the Court would sustain. The first case, Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,4 arose in 1976 over a Missouri
statute requiring parental consent for any minor before she could obtain an
abortion. In 1979, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 11)42 gave the Court an opportu-
nity to treat a variation of the consent issue. Then in 1981, the Court dealt
with a Utah law requiring physicians to "notify, if possible, the parents or
guardian of the [minor] woman upon whom [an] abortion is to be performed
... in H.L. v. Matheson.
44
The parental involvement issue came up again in two cases argued late
last year, which have not yet been decided.45 The remainder of this section will
discuss the constitutional model of parental notification which emerges from
the decided cases and the possible impact of the undecided case.
A. The Decided Cases
The Missouri statute considered in Danforth6 required written consent
from one parent or person in loco parentis of any unmarried woman under the
age of eighteen years who desired an abortion. 47 The Court held this no-excep-
tions consent requirement unconstitutional. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, objected to the state having "absolute power to overrule a determina-
tion"48 of the minor. He said that the state "does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over
the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's preg-
nancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."'
1
Justice Blackmun, however, was careful to point out that the Court's hold-
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
40 410 U.S. 113, 165 n. 67 (1973).
41 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
42 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(Bellotti II).
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
44 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
41 Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982); Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2267 (1982).
46 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
47 Id. at 85 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court H.C.S. House Bill No. 1211).
48 Id. at 75.
4&1 Id. at 74.
[Vol. 85
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ing does not stand for the proposition that "every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.1
49
Justice Stewart, concurring, went a step further by suggesting a legislative
model which the Court might sustain. He said:
[A] materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provi-
sion requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for
prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the
minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give an
informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is
in the minor's best interests. Such a provision would not impose parental ap-
proval as an absolute condition upon the minor's right but would assure in
most instances consultation between parent and child.50
Justice Stewart explained the policy behind this model:
There can be little doubt that the state furthers a constitutionally permissible
end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice
of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a
child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional
stress, may be ill equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support
from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for preg-
nant minors frequently take place.
51
At the same time the Danforth case was being decided, the Court was also
presented with a challenge to the Massachusetts parental consent statute men-
tioned above.52 But after briefing and oral argument, it was determined that
the statute "was susceptible of a construction that 'would avoid or substan-
tially modify the federal constitutional challenge'. . . ."" The federal district
court judgment, which had been appealed, was, therefore, vacated with the ex-
planation that the district court should have abstained and certified to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning
the meaning of the Massachusetts statute.54 Several years passed before the
case made its way back to the United States Supreme Court.55
Finally, by 1978, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I),5" had matured in the lower
courts, and was ready for reconsideration by the Court. The Massachusetts
statute at issue57 required that an unmarried minor have consent of both her
parents. If one or both parent refused consent, a court of general jurisdiction
could override their veto "for good cause shown." The United States Supreme
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.
49 Id. at 75.
Id. at 91-92.
8' Id. at 91.
:2 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)(Bellotti I).
3 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 628 (1979)(Bellotti II).
:4 Id. at 628-29.
5 Id.
56 Id.
57 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 112, § 125 (West Supp. 1979).
1983]
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Justice Powell's opinion said that "alternative procedures" must be pro-
vided to accommodate two classes of minors: (1) those who can demonstrate
that they are mature and well enough informed to make the abortion decision
independent of their parents, and (2) those who can demonstrate that their
best interests would not be served by the consent requirement.58 "In sum, the
procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not
in fact amount to the 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto' that was found
impermissible in Danforth.""8
Although eight justices agreed on the result of the case, there was no ma-
jority opinion, since the eight divided evenly over the manner in which the
conclusion was reached (Justice White dissented). Justice Powell, however, an-
nounced the judgment of the Court and set out some procedural guidelines as
an "attempt to provide some guidance as to how a state constitutionally may
provide for adult involvement... in the abortion decision of minors. ' He
said:
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by
Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to
go directly to a Court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she
satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelli-
gently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act
without parental consultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court tht
she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted
to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the
court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion. If, how-
ever, the court is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the
abortion would be in her best interests, it may decline to sanction the
operation.61
A quick head-count indicates that five members of the Court would have found
the statute constitutional if it had conformed to Justice Powell's model. The
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Powell in his
opinion, and since Justice White dissented on the ground that he found the
statute before the Court constitutional, it seems plain that he would uphold a
less restrictive version.62 Of course, Justice O'Connor's recent replacement of
Justice Stewart casts some uncertainty on the outcome of a similar case.
Before this change in the Court's personnel, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
sustained a statute tailored to resemble the Bellotti II model.6 3 The legislature
of Massachusetts did its homework after Bellotti II, and, in less than two
years, took its new statute back to the circuit court where it was sustained.",
The message of the Danforth-Bellotti II holdings is that a statute merely
requiring notification as opposed to consent, would pass constitutional scrutiny
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
8 Id. at 644.
Id. at 651-52 n.32.
6' Id. at 647-48.
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if it provided the alternative procedures laid out in the Bellotti II model. This
interpretation of the cases was confirmed in H. L. v. Matheson.5
The Utah statute requiring a physician to "[n]otify, if possible, the parent
or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is
a minor . . ."66 was upheld by a 6-3 margin in Matheson.6 7 The statute does
not provide the alternative procedures for mature minors or those for whom
abortion would be in their best interests. The Court did not consider the ab-
sence of these provisions fatal because the pregnant minor had not alleged ma-
turity or emancipation, and she advanced no evidence to support her allegation
that notification of her parents would not be in her best interests. She chal-
lenged the statute as a facially unconstitutional invasion of her privacy, "argu-
ing that a mere notice requirement is invalid per se without regard to the mi-
nor's age, whether she is emancipated, whether her parents are likely to be
obstructive, or whether there is some health or other reason why notification
would not be in the minor's best interests."6 8 The Court disagreed with her
argument and upheld the statute as it applied to immature, unemancipated
minors.
The Court obviously considered notification to be less intrusive than con-
sent. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said: "Although we have
held that a state may not constitutionally legislate a blanket, unreviewable
power of parents to veto their daughter's abortion, a statute setting out a 'mere
requirement of parental notice' does not violate the constitutional rights of an
immature, dependent minor. '' 9
The Matheson Court only addressed a very narrow question:
The only issue before us, then, is the facial constitutionality of a statute re-
quiring a physician to give notice to parents 'if possible', prior to performing
an abortion on their minor daughter, (a) when the girl is living with and de-
pendent upon her parents, (b) when she is not emancipated by marriage or
otherwise, and (c) when she has made no claim or showing as to her maturity
or as to her relations with her parents.70
The facts did not require the Court to decide in what circumstances a
state must provide alternative procedures to parental notification.7 1 The ma-
jority opinion, therefore, left the issue open-which suggests 2 that a no-excep-
tions parental notification statute could conceivably be upheld by the Court.
Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and White would clearly uphold such a statute.
7 3
65 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978).
67 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
:8 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)(Bellotti 1).
69 Id. at 409.
70 Id. at 407.
71 Id. at 412 n.22.
72 At least to those with a penchant for prognostication.
73 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94-95 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 421 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
1983]
9
Frame: Parental Notification and Abortion: A Review and Recommendation t
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Justice Burger would possibly join this group requiring only one more vote to
sustain. Justice O'Connor's views may be more clearly revealed by the decision
in the cases now pending.7 4 Her vote could supply the necessary fifth to form a
majority.
Concurring in H.L. v. Matheson, Justices Stewart and Powell expressed
their view that the alternative procedures of the Bellotti II model would also
be necessary in a notification statute:
[A] state may not validly require notice to parents in all cases, without provid-
ing an independent decision maker to whom a pregnant minor can have re-
course if she believes that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision




On November 30, 1982, lawyers from Virginia, Missouri, and Akron, Ohio,
defended abortion legislation in their respective states and city in oral argu-
ments before the United States Supreme Court.16 Of five cases argued, two
included issues relating to parental notice and consent.
The first case, Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron 77 is
identical to H. L. v. Matheson7 8 in regard to the parental notice issue. The city
ordinance in dispute is being challenged because it does not provide for judi-
cial determination of the minor's maturity or best interests, as required by Bel-
lotti H.7 The appellants were abortion clinics and a physician; no minor fe-
male was questioning the validity of the Akron ordinance. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a lower court finding of unconstitutionality, 0 ex-
plaining that "[U]ntil the requirements of § 1870.05(A) are questioned by a
minor who claims to be mature or emancipated or claims that notice would not
be in her best interest, we cannot hold the section facially invalid." 81 It seems
unlikely that the standing argument will be disputed on review, since the other
case more clearly presents the issue reserved in H.L. v. Matheson.
82
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., v. Ash-
craft,83 presents the question "left open in Matheson,"'84 which is, "whether it
7' Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S., May 22, 1982) (Nos. 81-746, 81-1172); Planned Parenthood Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (U.S., May
22, 1982) (Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623).
" 450 U.S. at 420.
78 51 U.S.L.W. 3433 (Dec. 2, 1982).
651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W: 3934 (U.S. May 22, 1982) (Nos.
81-746, 81-1172).
78 450 U.S. 398.
" 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
10 Akron, 651 F.2d 1198.
81 Id. at 1206.
82 450 U.S. 398 (1981).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/8
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION
is constitutionally permissible to require mature or 'best interests' minors to
notify their parents prior to a court hearing in which they seek judicial consent
for an abortion."' 5 Citing the concurring opinion of Justices Powell and Stew-
art, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the alternative procedures
are necessary to sustain a notification requirement."6 The circuit court ac-
knowledged that the Matheson opinion explicitly "left open" the question, but
they noted that since Justices Powell and Stewart would require the alterna-
tive procedures and since three other justices (Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun) would not uphold any notice requirement, these five votes would clearly
defeat a no-exceptions notice requirement. As mentioned earlier, Justice
O'Connor's replacement of Justice Stewart makes her vote pivotal in this issue.
At any rate, the Court will have its opportunity to answer the question in
Ashcroft.
8 7
A number of other issues related to consent were raised by the City of
Akron and Ashcroft cases. For example, the Akron ordinance requires consent
from one parent of a pregnant girl under fifteen, or from the court. The out-
come of these issues will not affect the validity of a "mere requirement of pa-
rental notice."88
Although there are several issues which may yet be refined regarding pa-
rental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, the Court has clearly ap-
proved a notification requirement with alternative procedures for "mature" or
"best interests" minors. Barring the possibility of outright reversal, a state leg-
islature would appear to be safe in enacting a provision already tested and
sustained if it reflects a policy which would meet with the approval of the
lawmakers' constitutents. In light of this conclusion, the next section will con-
sider whether West Virginia parental notification bill is constitutional.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA'S PARENTAL NOTIFICATON STATUTE
A. Legislative History of the West Virginia Bill
In West Virginia, Senate bill No. 24389 was introduced on January 25, 1982
84 Id. at 859.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. It is expected that the Court will issue an opinion by mid-summer on the cases argued
November 30, 1982.
81 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981).
"9 Senate Bill No. 243, Parental consent required for abortion performed on minors.
(a) No physician may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated pregnant woman
under the age of eighteen years without first having given at least twenty-four hours
actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor pregnant woman as
to the intention to perform such abortion or if such parent or guardian cannot be
reached after a reasonable effort to find him, without first having given at least forty-
eightcle of legislation and litigation which occurs over virtually every attempt to regulate
abortion services is reminiscent of last known address of one of the parents or guardian,
computed from the time of mailing.
(b) Notice under this section may be waived by the circuit court for the county in which
the minor resides if the court finds that the minor is mature enough to make the abor-
1983]
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and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary by Senator Odell Huffman. It
required, in substance, that a physician notify the parents of unemancipated
minors who intend to have an abortion twenty-four hours before performing
the abortion. The requirement could be waived by a judicial determination
that the minor is mature enough to make the decision independently or that it
would not be in her best interests to notify her parents. The physicians failure
to comply would be a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.
The bill was ultimately approved by the 1982 legislature but vetoed by the
governor. The veto was based on a technical defect in the bill's title. The origi-
nal title, "Parental Consent (sic)90 Required For Abortion Performed on Mi-
nors" lacked the constitutionally required notice that violation of the bill could
result in criminal prosecution. The governor said the title did not comport with
the West Virginia Constitution9' as interpreted in State ex rel. Myers v.
Wood 92 in this respect. Other statutes meet this requirement by simply adding
the word "penalties" following the title and a semicolon. For example, West
Virginia's drunk driving law is titled "Driving under the influence of alcohol,
controlled substances or drugs; penalties." 3
The 1982 legislative session had already ended, and a special session to
correct this minor flaw would be very costly, so the bill failed. George
Carenbaurer, the governor's legal advisor, refused to comment on whether the
governor objected to the substantive content of the bill, saying it was not nec-
essary to reach that question since they considered the bill constitutionally de-
fective on its face.94 The bill was reintroduced in 1983 with the appropriate
addition-"penalties"-to the title.
On January 21, 1983, the bill was reintroduced by Senators, Ash and
Huffman and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary as Senate Bill No.
188.1" This time the bill had several significant changes. The revised bill pro-
tion decision independently or that notification would not be in the minor's best
interests.
(c) This section does not apply where there is an emergency need for an abortion to be
performed such that continuation of the pregnancy provides an immediate threat and
grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman and the attending physician so
certifies in writing.
(d) Any physician performing an abortion upon an unemancipated pregnant woman
under the age of eighteen years shall provide the department of health a written report
of the procedure within thirty days after having performed the abortion. The report shall
be on a form and in the manner prescribed and provided by the director of the depart-
ment of health.
(e) Anyone who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than fifty dollars or impris-
oned in the county jail not more than thirty days, or both fined and imprisoned.
90 The title on the bill, as it was introduced, uses the word "consent", but the content of the
bill only requires notice; so this is either a typo or a misstatement.
91 W.Va. Const. art. VI, sec. 30.
:2 154 W.Va. 431, 175 S.E.2d 637 (1970).
93 W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2 (Supp. 1982).
Telephone interview with George Carenbauer, the governor's legal advisor (Jan. 25, 1983).
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vided that the child's maturity level be determined by a second disinterested
physician, instead of the circuit court. The revised bill also attached an addi-
tional paragraph making it a felony for anyone other than a licensed physician
to perform, or attempt to perform, an abortion on a minor. Several amend-
ments were made after the bill was introduced, Bill No. 243 is the form in
which the sponsors ultimately wished to enact the law. Certain modifications
to Senate Bill No. 188 were made to conciliate opponents of the bill; although
the sponsors hoped to amend these provisions after discussion of the bill and
before a final reading and vote. These modifications either limit the effect of
the bill or cast serious constitutional doubts on the bill. The modifications and
other amendments made after the bill was introduced will be considered next.
B. Changes in the Original Legislation
As mentioned earlier, significant changes were made in the form of the
bill, since its inception as Senate Bill No. 243. Three significant changes were
made: (1) Senate Bill No. 188 would allow a second disinterested physician
(not performing the abortion) to make the determination of whether the preg-
nant minor is mature or the abortion would serve her best interest. This proce-
(a) No physician may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated pregnant woman
under the age of eighteen years without first having given at least twenty-four hours
actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor pregnant woman as
to the intention to perform such abortion or if such parent or guardian cannot be
reached after a reasonable effort to find him or her, without first having given at least
forty-eight hours constructive notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian of the
minor pregnant woman by certified mail to the last known address of one of the parents
or guardian, computed from the time of mailing: Provided, That the parents may, in a
personal interview with the physician, execute a written waiver of the twenty-four hour
notice requirement of this section.
(b) Notice under this section may be waived by a physician other than the attending
physician if such physician finds that the minor is mature enough to make the abortion
decision independently or that notification would not be in the minor's best interest:
Provided, That such physician shall not be associated professionally or financially with
the physician proposing to perform the abortion.
(c) This section does not apply where there is an emergency need for an abortion to be
performed such that continuation of the pregnancy provides an immediate threat and
grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman and the attending physician so
certifies in writing.
(d) Any physician performing an abortion upon an unemancipated pregnant woman
under the age of eighteen years shall provide the department of health a written report
of the procedure within thirty days after having performed the abortion. The report shall
be on a form and in the manner prescribed and provided by the director of the depart-
ment of health. The report shall not contain the name, address or other information by
which the woman receiving the abortion may be identified.
(e) Anyone who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than fifty dollars or impris-
oned in the county jail not more than thirty days, or both fined and imprisoned.
(f) Any person who, without being first duly licensed as a physician in this state, per-
forms or attempts to perform an abortion upon another person who is an unemancipated
pregnant woman under the age of eighteen years is guilty of felony, and, upon conviction
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dure would replace the judicial determination of Senate Bill No. 243. (2) Sen-
ate Bill No. 188 was amended to provide for waiver of the notification if the
pregnant minor receives professional counselling. (3) Senate Bill No. 188 was
further amended to require notification of the putative father's parents as well
as the pregnant woman's parents. The first change was apparently a good faith
attempt by the sponsors to conciliate opponents of the bill. But the other
amendments were probably efforts by opponents to defeat the bill indirectly.
(1) Determination of "maturity" or "best interests" by second physician.-
Substituting the second opinion of a disinterested physician for the judicial
determination would surely subject the bill to judicial scrutiny, although it
may be constitutional. In Bellotti II, Justice Powell said, "We do not suggest,
however, that a State choosing to require parental consent could not delegate
the alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an administrative agency or
officer. Indeed, much can be said for employing procedures and a forum less
formal than those associated with a court of general jurisdiction." 90 In Mathe-
son the concurring justices merely referred to "an independent decision
maker, 1 97 but whether this would extend to a disinterested physician is highly
questionable.
(2) Professional counselling as substitute for notification.-The amend-
ment of Senate Bill No. 188, providing for waiver of notification if the preg-
nant minor receives professional counselling, is constitutional inasmuch as it
would clearly be less restrictive than provisions already sustained by the Su-
preme Court. The provision would, however, defeat the intent of the legisla-
tion. Most, if not all, private abortion clinics already have staff counselors who
counsel the prospective patients. The inherent bias of a staff counselor would
probably not serve the state's interests in parental involvement and informed
decision making. Professor Lynn Wardle, whose amicus brief was relied on ex-
tensively by the Chief Justice in H.L. v. Matheson, said elsewhere, "(a) preg-
nant unmarried teen-age girl is especially vulnerable to the guiles and pres-
sures of pro-abortion counselors outside the family whose commitment to her
individually (as distinguished from commitment to the clinic or the 'cause') is
questionable to begin with, and (unlike her parent's concern) transitory at
best." '
Writing for the Court in Matheson, the Chief Justice said:
While the medical judgment of a physician of course is to be respected, there is
no reason to believe as a general proposition that even the most conscientious
physician's interest in the overall welfare of a minor can be equated with that
of most parents. Moreover, abortion clinics, now readily available in most ur-
ban communities, may be operated on a commercial basis where abortions
often may be obtained 'on demand'."99
It is unlikely that a perfunctory interview with a staff counselor at a private
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.22 (1979) (plurality opinion (Bellotti I)).
450 U.S. at 420.
,L. WARDLE AND M. WOOD, supra note 13, at 88.
"450 U.S. at 420 n.8 (emphasis added).
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abortion clinic will change this.
(3) Notification to parents of putative father.-The amendment to Senate
Bill No. 188 requiring notification to the parents of the putative father was a
blatant attempt to make the law "unduly burdensome"100 and thereby uncon-
stitutional. Depending on the drafting of this provision and the inclusion of a
severability clause, it might not completely invalidate the bill, but its purpose
is transparent.
Considering the discussion in section H, the basic substantive provisions of
Senate Bill No. 243 are constitutional. The bill provides for a judicial determi-
nation regarding whether the minor was mature enough to make her decision
independently or whether for some reason notifying her parents would not be
in her best interests. This would satisfy a majority of the Court. However, the
modifications and amendments to Senate Bill No. 188 would create some con-
stitutional problems, as previously discussed.
As the 1983 session of the legislature drew to a close, the bill had been
amended many times. By the time it was ready for a final reading and a vote
on the floor of the legislature, it still contained provisions which either de-
feated the sponsor's intent or endangered its constitutional status. As a result,
the bill was not put to a vote.
After overcoming the hurdle of drafting a constitutional bill, the legisla-
ture can devote its energy to deciding whether it should be enacted as a matter
of policy. Some policy matters are discussed in the following section.
V. POLICY
The "privacy" rights found in the penumbras of the United States Consti-
tution encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy by abor-
tion.101 Legislation restricting the exercise of such "fundamental" constitu-
tional rights must be justified by some compelling state interest.102 The
Supreme Court has ruled that states may not enact laws which "unduly bur-
den"103 a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy, but, on the
other hand, "[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its stat-
utes so as to encourage and facilitate abortions."'04 Parental involvement
clearly burdens a minor's abortion decision, and therefore, must be based on
some compelling policy reasons.
The proponents of parental involvement argue that it is justified by the
state's interest in parental authority, family integrity, and protection of adoles-
cents. The arguments against such involvement are based on a minor's right to
privacy. Within the permissible limits established by the Supreme Court pre-
cedent, each state must assign weight to these opposing interests, as it sees fit.
Some of these interests are considered in this section.
100 See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
101 Id. at 153.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 450 U.S. at 413.
19831
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A. Parental Authority
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Matheson, concedes that "[tihis Court, of
course, has recognized that the 'primary' role of parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tra-
dition." 105 Nevertheless, a long list of counselors and pro-abortion groups, sub-
mitting amicus briefs in the Matheson case 0 s "insist that parents must, as a
matter of constitutional law, be denied any favored position. . . in the compe-
tition over who will provide ... counsel to pregnant adolescents.' 0 7
The extreme egalitarianism of these groups is opposed to the traditional
social structure as well as the history of the law. There is abundant precedent
granting parental rights constitutional protection. 108 Chief Justice Burger
noted in Matheson that "the short shrift given by the dissent to 'parental au-
thority and family integrity'. . runs contrary to a long line of constitutional
cases in this Court."109 Justice Stewart noted, in Parham v. J. R.,1 0 that "[flor
centuries it has been a canon of the common law that parents speak for their
10 Id. at 447.
206 In an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the state of Utah, Professor Lynn Wardle
comments:
The list of amici curiae who have filed briefs urging that the parental notification law be
declared unconstitutional underscores the point that the critical question in this case
concerns who will be given the primary opportunity to counsel with minors, and dramati-
cally suggests the very real consequences that will result if this Court nullifies the Utah
law. Amici supporting Appellant include: The Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., which operates 744 family planning clinics (some of which offer abortions)
in 43 states and the District of Columbia (Brief of Planned Parenthood Amici at 2); the
American Association of Sex Educators, Counselors and Therapists; the National Associ-
ation of Social Workers, Inc., a "substantial portion of [whose] 80,000 members are em-
ployed in child welfare, in school social work and in family service agencies" (id. at 5),
the American Public Health Association, with membership of over 50,000 "professional
health workers and consumers" (id. at 4); the National Abortion Federation, "composed
of both professional individuals and groups providing abortion services" (id. at 6). The
members of these organizations are engaged in the business of offering counsel regarding
abortion to pregnant women, including teenagers. Not surprisingly, they agree that
mandatory abortion counselling is constitutionally appropriate (indeed necessary). But
they insist that parents must, as a matter of constitutional law, be denied any favored
position (mandatory notification) in the competition over who will provide that counsel
to pregnant adolescents. (In fact, they artfully imply that since they are experts whose
judgment would not be warped by emotional attachments, they ought to be preferred
over amateur, emotionally involved parents. They fail to recognize that the parents will
be dealing with their daughter for years to come, long after the "professionals" have
disappeared from the scene.)
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 n.18 (1979) (citing Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977)); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 708
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-05
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
109 450 U.S. at 411 n.18.
110 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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minor children."' ' In Parham the Court reflected on "[t]he law's concept of
the family," saying that it "rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically, it has been
rcognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best inter-
ests of their children."'
The chapter of the West Virginia Code dealing with child welfare speaks
of the "fundamental rights of parenthood." '1 2"1 The right of parents to raise
their children as they see fit is constitutionally protected."'
Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children
is basic in the structure of our own society. It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care, and nurture reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder .... The legislature could properly conclude that parents and
others ... who have the primary responsibility for children's well being are
entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.
114
A parental notification statute arguably provides just such aid.1 5
B. Protection of Adolescents
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that no
distinction between an adult and a minor was permissible regarding "the scope
of . . .constitutional freedom."" 6 The state may treat minors unequally, in
some circumstances, to protect them from the consequences of their own im-
mature judgment. The minor's capacity for sound discretion in regard to abor-
tions is a subject of disagreement. For example, Justice Marshall joins those
who believe the state should take a laissez-faire approach to adolescent abor-
tions because "one can well argue that an adolescent old enough to make the
decision to be sexually active. . ., and who then is responsible enough to seek
professional assistance for his or her problem, is ipso facto mature enough to
consent to his own health care." 1 7 Justice Burger disagrees, saying: "there is
"I Id. at 621.
112 Id. at 602.
"' W.VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (1982 Supp.).
"' See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
M Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis added).
1'l Consider the fact that tort cases have been instituted against parents who failed in their
obligations to guide their children properly and many states have "neglect" laws which impose a
duty of appropriate care on the parents. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (1981), imposing on
parents a duty to provide "adequate food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care," also,
"proper care and attention emotionally and morally." See generally, Garvey, Freedom and Choice
in Constitutional Law, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1756 (1981).
:6 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, (1968) (Brennan, J., majority opinion).
17 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 433 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting, quoting Hoffman,
CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY AND THEIR LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE, IN MEDICAL CARE OF THE ADOLESCENT 51 (J. Gallagher, F. Heald and D. Garrel eds. 3d
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no logical relationship between the capacity to become pregnant and the ca-
pacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion."' 1 8
There seems to be little dispute over the proposition that the risks of
physical and emotional complications after abortions are significantly greater
among minors.11 In Matheson, Chief Justice Burger cites medical authorities
supplied by Professor Wardle's amicus brief to support the fact that
"[a]bortion is associated with an increase of complications in subsequent
pregnancies,' 1 20 and "[t]he emotional and psychological effects of the preg-
nancy and abortion experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than
in adults."12' The Chief Justice had earlier expressed the fear that "[m]any
minors who bypass their parents probably will resort to an abortion clinic,
without being able to distinguish the competent and ethical from those that
are incompetent and unethical.' 2 2 Parents could provide badly needed guid-
ance regarding this serious medical procedure.
One of the striking ironies of abortion policy is that it is treated so differ-
ently from other medical procedures. "As the law now stands, for no other
medical procedure performed on a minor are parental rights as severely re-
stricted by Constitutional doctrine. Indeed, in most states, virtually no other
medical procedure can be performed on a minor without parental consent."' 2
Another protective factor is that parental involvement will help the doctor
exercise his best medical judgment.24 In initiating the current abortion policy,
the Supreme Court clearly relied on physicians' commitment to consider "all
factors physical, emotional, psychological, familial and the woman's age rele-
vant to the well being of the patient,""-2 5 before recommending an abortion.
Parental involvement fulfills this commitment. Physicians generally strongly
recommend parental involvement when a minor desires an abortion."16
C. Family Integrity
The state interest in preserving the integrity of the family tradition should
not be passed over lightly. The family, as an institution, has historically en-
ed. 1976).
118 450 U.S. at 408.
19 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411 n.20.
120 Id., citing Maine, Does Abortion Affect Later Pregnancies? 11 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 98
(1979).
121 450 U.S. at 408 n.20, citing Wallerstein, Kurtz & Bur-Din, Psychological Sequalae of Ther-
apeutic Abortions in Young Unmarried Women, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828 (1972); See also
Babikial & Goldman, A Study in Teen-age Pregnancy, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 955 (1971).
122 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti II).
"I L. WARDLE & M. WooD, supra note 13 at 89.
124 Id.
12 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
12 Hanson, Abortion in Teenagers, 21 CLIN. OB. AND GYN. 1175, 1180-81 (1978); Butler &
Fujtu, Abortion Screening and Counselling: A Brief Guide for Physicians, 50 POST GRAD. MED.
208, 212 (1971); American Academy of Pediatrics, Pregnancy and Abortion Counselling, 63 PEDI-
ATRICS 920, 921 (1979); Perez-Reyes & Falk, Follow-up After Therapeutic Abortion in Early Ado-
lescence, 28 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 120, 124 (1973).
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joyed a preferred status as a mechanism for support and conflict resolution.
Defeat of legislation facilitating parental involvement in important moral deci-
sions of their children is tantamount to an institutional vote of "no confidence"
to the family tradition. Rejecting the legislation in order to protect those few
minors whose parents will not act in the best interests of their child is like the
proverbial burning the barn to kill the rat.
Shortly after the Roe v. Wade decision, commentators anticipated the im-
pact on families. They wrote:
[T]he family unit does not simply co-exist with our constitutional system; it is
an integral part of it. In democratic theory as well as in practice, it is in the
family that children are expected to learn the values and beliefs that demo-
cratic institutions later draw on to determine group directions. The immensely
important power of deciding about matters of early socialization has been allo-
cated to the family, not the government. 2 '
D. The Minor's Right to Choose
Opponents of parental involvement dispute the minor's lack of judgment,
saying, "a minor's abortion decision in itself tends to show the foresight and
deliberation that mark mature decision making. 1 28 They bolster their opposi-
tion by predicting dire consequences if parental notice is mandatory. For ex-
ample, a student commentator wrote:
The effects of requiring parental notification can be dramatic. One study on
the probable impact of parental notification estimates tht 19,000 minor women
would resort to self-induced or illegal abortions and that 18,000 more minor
women would bear unwanted children, were parental notification required. In
addition, another 5,000 minors would run away from home either to have the
unwanted child or to obtain an illegal abortion. If the minor woman gives birth
as a result of parental pressure, there are increased health risks to the child.
For example, the infant death rate is higher for children born to women under
twenty and minor women are far more likely to have premature, or low-birth-
weight babies.
1 29
These arguments demonstrate the diametric disagreement of proponents
and opponents of parental involvement, underscoring the need for legislatures
to determine the opinions of their constituencies on this divisive issue. In West
Virginia no effort has been made by the legislature to ascertain public opinion
on this issue, other than that represented by lobbyists or participants in public




127 Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees; Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 765, 772-73 (1973).
128 Dembitz, The Supreme Court and the Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1251,
1262 (1980).
229 Comment, Parental Notification: A State Created Obstacle to a Minor's Right to Privacy,
12 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 579, 587 (1982). The Golden Gate Law Review Comment and the article
cited in note 128, supra, are typical of recently published material opposing parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision. This Note does not undertake to present the policy arguments
against parental involvement. They are adequately, indeed vigorously, presented elsewhere.
'29.1 The author of this Note attempted to obtain funds to commission a public opinion poll,
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VI. MODEL STATUTE1 3 0
In order to accurately define the policy of parental notice and to properly
present the issue to the legislature, the bill presented to the legislators must be
constitutionally sound. This Note has attempted to illuminate the essential
provisions of such a bill. The conclusion has been asserted that Senate Bill No.
243 meets these standards. The bill could, however, be improved. Therefore,
this section suggests a model parental notice statute which may clarify the
meaning and intent of the bill and protect it against judicial challenge.
Although the major substantive provisions of a constitutional parental no-
tice statute seem to be settled, opponents of the statute will continue to look
for chinks in the law. The following discussion and recommended provisions
are an attempt to anticipate such challenges.
The statute should contain sections on: (1) legislative intent, (2) defini-
tions, (3) the basic notice requirement, with an opportunity for the minor to
have a judicial determination of her "maturity" or "best interests" if she
desires one, (4) mandatory procedures relating to the judicial determination,
(5) emergency exceptions to the notice requirement, (6) penalties for violation
of the statute, including scienter (state of mind) requirements, (7) a require-
ment that the abortion be reported to a state agency without identifying the
patient, and (8) a severability clause. Following are sample sections and an
explanation of each:
§ (1) Legislative Intent.
In accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979)(Bellotti II), and H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), which
acknowledge the existence of important and compelling state interests in 1)
protecting minors against their own immaturity; 2) fostering the family struc-
ture and preserving it as a viable social unit; and 3) protecting the rights of
parents to rear their children in their own household, it is the intent of the
legislature to further these interests by enacting this parental notice provision.
The legislature finds as fact that 1) immature minors often lack the ability to
make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-
range consequences; 2) the medical, emotional and psychological consequences
of abortion are serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is im-
mature; 3) the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judg-
ment concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not logically related; 4) parents
ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best
medical judgment concerning the child; 5) parents who are aware that their
minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that she receives ade-
quate medical attention after her abortion. The legislature further finds that
parental consultation is usually desirable and in the best interests of the
minor.
but was unable to do so. An issue of this magnitude should merit such a study.
130 This model notice statute is adapted from a model statute recommended by Americans
United For Life, Legal Defense Fund, 230 N. Michigan # 915, Chicago, Ill. 60601, (312) 263-5029.
The discussion in this section is based on material supplied by Americans United for Life, Legal
Defense Fund, 230 N. Michigan # 915, Chicago, Ill. 60601, (312) 263-5029. The model statute is
adapted from the statute which they recommend.
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Particularly in states like West Virginia which do not maintain records of
legislative history (e.g. hearings, committee reports, and floor debates), includ-
ing a section which sets out the legislative intent is helpful. It ensures that all
the legislators who voted in favor of the law understood its purpose and intent.
A statement of legislative intent obviates the possibility of an attack on the
basis of unconstitutional intent, and it frames the issues for litigation. 3'
§ (2) Definitions.
For purposes of this Act, the following definitions will apply:
(a) "minor" means any person under the age of 18;
(b) "emancipated minor" means any minor who is or has been married or has
by court order otherwise been freed from the care, custody, and control of her
parents;
(c) "actual notice" means the giving of notice directly, in person or by
telephone;
(d) "constructive notice" means the giving of notice by certified mail to the
last known address of the parent(s) or legal guardian;
(e) "abortion" means the use of any instrument, medicine, drug or any other
substance or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known
to be pregnant with intent other than to cause live birth.
Although there do not appear to be any definitions in the West Virginia
Code which conflict with important terms in this notice statute, providing defi-
nitions which expressly apply to the statute precludes any possible conflict.
This measure may also prevent a challenge on the grounds of vagueness. 3'
§ (3) Parental Notice Required.
(a) No physician may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor un-
less he or his agent has given at least twenty-four (24) hours actual notice to
one of the parents or to the legal guardian of the minor pregnant woman of his
intention to perform the abortion, or, if the parent or guardian cannot be
reached after a reasonable effort to find him or her, without first having given
at least forty-eight (48) hours constructive notice computed from the time of
mailing to the parent or to the legal guardian of the minor. If neither parent
nor the legal guardian is available to the person performing the abortion within
a reasonable time or manner, notice to any adult person standing in loco
parentis shall be sufficient.
(b) A minor who objects to notice being given her parent or legal guardian
under this section may petition, on her own behalf or by next friend, the cir-
cuit court in the county in which the minor resides or in which the abortion is
to be performed for a waiver of the notice requirement of this section pursuant
to the procedures of section 4 of this Act.
The basic provisions in this section have been discussed throughout this
Note, but special care has been taken to draft this section so that it cannot be
construed to be unduly burdensome. This section allows a physician "or his
agent" to notify parents. This prevents a challenge on the basis of undue ex-
pense and burden caused by requiring the physician to personally locate and
131 Americans United For Life, Permissible Parental Involvement In the Minor's Abortion De-
cision, 9-10 (unpublished memorandum).
1"2 See also Id. at 12-13.
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notify the parents. 13 3 This section also allows notice to only one parent which
reduces the burden in cases where parents are divorced and one or both are
hard to locate.
The twenty-four and forty-eight hour delay provision should not be a
problem. Indeed, the whole policy of parental involvement would be a sham if
parents were not given time to advise their daughter and possibly consult with
the physician. The statute could be attacked on the ground that its require-
ments are not rationally related to its purpose if some reasonable delay is not
provided.
1 34
The judicial determination of subsection (b) satisfies the alternative proce-
dures requirement discussed earlier in this Note,"35 but this judicial procedure
must be carried out fairly and expeditiously or it may be subject to chal-
lenge.136 Therefore, mandatory procedures are set out in the next section.
§ (4) Judicial Proceedings.
(a) The requirements and procedures under this Act apply and are available to
minors whether or not they are residents of this State.
(b) The minor may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf
and the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The court shall advise
her that she has a right to court appointed counsel and shall provide her with
such counsel upon her request or if she is not already adequately represented.
(c) Court proceedings under this section shall be confidential and shall be
given such precedence over other pending matters as is necessary to ensure
that the court may reach a decision promptly, but in no case shall the court
fail to rule within 48 hours of the time of application.
(d) Notice shall be waived if the court finds either:
(i) That the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the
abortion decision on her own, or
(ii) That notification of those to whom section 3 of this Act requires
notice be given would not be in the best interests of the minor.
(e) A court that conducts proceedings under this section shall issue written and
specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision and shall
order that a confidential record of the evidence be maintained.
(f) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any minor to whom
the court denies a waiver of notice. The Supreme Court of Appeals shall issue
promptly such rules as are necessary to preserve confidentiality and to ensure
the expeditious disposition of procedures provided by this section.
(g) No filing fees shall be required of any minor or incompetent who avails
herself of the procedures provided by this section.
The provision making this statute applicable to nonresidents prevents an
attack on the basis that the law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution.137 The mandatory expedited hearing and
133 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980).
'3' See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412; Hodgson v. Minnesota, No. 3-81 CIV. 538 (D.
Minn. Mar. 23, 1982); Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, No. IP 82-1766-C (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 1982).
'35 See supra text accompanying notes 40-88.
"' See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
'37 U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2. See Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, No. IP 82-1766-C (S.D.
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appeal would prevent an attack such as one which was successful in the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Wynn v. Carey, 38 the circuit court said that,
"[b]ecause of the fundamental nature of the rights involved, because of the
lack of legal sophistication of minors generally, and because of the urgency
inherent in an abortion decision itself, it is imperative that the procedures be
spelled out in detail in the statute itself."' 39 The other various provisions of
this section are drafted to ensure that the judicial procedures are uniform, fair,
expeditious, and inexpensive.
§ (5) Exception.
This section does not apply where there is an emergency need for an abortion
to be performed such that continuation of the pregnancy provides an immedi-
ate threat and grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman and the
attending physician so certifies in writing.
Without this section the statute would clearly be unduly burdensome,
even dangerous.
§ (6) Reporting.
Any physician performing an abortion upon an unemancipated minor shall
provide the department of health a written report of the procedure within
thirty days after having performed the abortion. The report shall be on a form
and in the manner prescribed and provided by the director of the department
of health. The report shall not contain the name, address or other information
by which the woman receiving the abortion may be identified.
This section serves a number of salutary purposes such as aiding medical
research and guiding the government in allocating funds to health care agen-
cies. The requirement imposes a minimal burden on the physician. Further, if
the section is deemed too burdensome, it can be severed without invalidating
the remainder of the statute.IL
0
§ (7) Penalties.
Any person who performs an abortion with knowledge that, or with reckless
disregard as to whether, the person upon whom the abortion is performed is an
unemancipated minor, and who intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly fails to
conform to any requirement of this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more
than fifty dollars or imprisoned in the county jail not more than thirty days, or
both fined and imprisoned.
This section provides the critical scienter requirement which is necessary
when a criminal penalty is imposed."'
§ (8) Severability.
If any provision, word, phrase or clause of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not af-
Ind. Oct. 11, 1982).
239 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
139 Id. at 1389; See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 144-45 (1976) (Bellotti 1) and Planned
Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1981).
"0 Cf. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214 (1982).
"4 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
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fect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses or application of this Act which can
be given effect without the invalid provision, word, phrase, clause, or applica-
tion, and to this end the provisions, words, phrases, and clauses of this Act are
declared to be severable.
This type of provision is commonly used to save constitutional provisions
of a statute where other distinct provisions in a statute are not valid.142
In this matter of constitutional hair-splitting, the drafting of the bill is a
critical task. The proposed provisions set out above may not be immune to
every possible assault-there are some very imaginative constitutional lawyers
out there-but, in light of the litigation and literature to date, it appears to be
quite sound.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the decade since national abortion policy was revolutionized by Roe v.
Wade, the controversy has not diminished but increased. A particularly emo-
tional issue is the abortion rights of minors. Laws requiring parental involve-
ment in their minor daughter's abortion decision have met with varying de-
grees of success nationwide. West Virginia's legislature has failed to enact a
parental notification law which was introduced and considered in both 1982
and 1983. The bill in its original form (Senate Bill No. 243) meets the stan-
dards suggested by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Danforth,
Bellotti, and Matheson cases. The law serves important state interests which
justifies the added burden on a minor's abortion decision. The legislature
should determine whether the policy of parental involvement is consistent with
the values of West Virginians and act on such a bill accordingly. This Note also
suggests a model statute which is designed to clarify the legislature's meaning
and intent and avoid some problems of implementation.
14 3
David W. Frame
142 See e.g., West Virginia Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, W. VA. CODE § 36-7-11 (1982 Supp.).
' The entire text of the model notice statute is set out below:
Parental notification required for abortion performed on minors; penalties.
§ (1) Legislative Intent.
In accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979)(Bellotti II), and H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), which acknowledge the
existence of important and compelling state interests in 1) protecting minors against
their own immaturity, 2) fostering the family structure and preserving it as a viable so-
cial unit, and 3) protecting the rarental rights as severely restricted by Constitutional
doctrine. Indeed, in most states, virtually no other medical proceduts by enacting this
parental notice provision.
The legislature finds as fact that 1) immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, 2)
the medical, emotional and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and can
be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature, 3) the the current abortion policy,
the Supreme Court clearly relied on physicians' commitment to consider "all factors
physical, eted, 4) parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exer-
cise of his best medical judgment concerning the child, 5) parents who are aware that
their minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that she receives adequate
medical attention after her abortion. The legislature further finds that parental consulta-"
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tion is usually desirable and in the best interests of the minor.
§ (2) Definitions.
For purposes of this Act, the following definitions will apply:
(a) "minor" means any person under the age of 18;
(b) "emancipated minor" means any minor who is or has been married or has by court
order otherwise been freed from the care, custody, and control of her parents;
(c) "actual notice" means the giving of notice directly, in person or by telephone;
(d) "constructive notice" means the giving of notice by certified mail to the last known
address of the parent(s) or legal guardian;
(e) "abortion" means the use of any instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance
or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with
intent other than to cause live birth.
§ (3) Parental Notice Required.
(a) No physician may perform an abortion upon an unemancipated minor unless he or
his agent has given at least twenty-four (24) hours actual notice to one of the parents or
to the legal guardian of the minor pregnant woman of his intention to perform the abor-
tion, or, if the parent or guardian cannot be reached after a reasonable effort to find him
or her, without first having given at least forty-eight (48) hours constructive notice com-
puted from the time of mailing to the parent or to the legal guardian of the minor. If
neither parent nor the legal guardian is available to the person performing the abortion
within a reasonable time or manner, notice to any adult person standing in loco parentis
shall be sufficient.
(b) A minor who objects to notice being given her parent or legal guardian under this
section may petition, on her own behalf or by next friend, the circuit court in the county
in which the minor resides or in which the abortion is to be performed for a waiver of the
notice requirement of this section pursuant to the procedures of section 4 of this Act.
§ (4) Judicial Proceedings.
(a) The requirements and procedures under this Act apply and are available to minors
whether or not they are residents of this State.
(b) The minor may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf and the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The court shall advise her that she has a
right to court appointed counsel and shall provide her with such counsel upon her re-
quest or if she is not already adequately represented.
(c) Court proceedings under this section shall be confidential and shall be given such
precedence over other pending matters as is necessary to ensure that the court may
reach a decision promptly, but in no case shall the court fail to rule within 48 hours of
the time of application.
(d) Notice shall be waived if the court finds either:
(i) That the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion deci-
sion on her own, or
(ii) That notification of those to whom section 3 of this Act requires notice be
given would not be in the best interests of the minor.
(e) A court that conducts proceedings under this section shall issue written and specific
factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision and shall order that a confi-
dential record of the evidence be maintained.
(f) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any minor to whom the court
denies a waiver of notice. The Supreme Court of Appeals shall issue promptly such rules
as are necessary to preserve confidentiality and to ensure the expeditious disposition of
procedures provided by this section.
(g) No filing fees shall be required of any minor or incompetent who avails herself of the
procedures provided by this section.
§ (5) Exception.
This section does not apply where there is an emergency need for an abortion to be
performed such that continuation of the pregnancy provides an immediate threat and
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§ (6) Reporting.
Any physician performing an abortion upon an unemancipated minor shall provide the
department of health a written report of the procedure within thirty days after having
performed the abortion. The report shall be on a form and in the manner prescribed and
provided by the director of the department of health. The report shall not contain the
name, address or other information by which the woman receiving the abortion may be
identified.
§ (7) Penalties.
Any person who performs an abortion with knowledge that, or with reckless disregard as
to whether, the person upon whom the abortion is performed is an unemancipated mi-
nor, and who intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly fails to conform to any require-
ment of this statute is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than fifty dollars or imprisoned in the county
jail not more than thirty days, or both fined and imprisoned.
§ (8) Severability.
If any provision, word, phrase or clause of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provi-
sions, words, phrases, clauses or application of this Act which can be given effect without
the invalid provision, word, phrase, clause, or application, and to this end the provisions,
words, phrases, and clauses of this Act are declared to be severable.
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